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Classics Lectures Series Presents: Jake Haagenson (Columbia University)

  • Department of Classics at Columbia University in the City of New York 1130 Amsterdam Avenue, 603 Hamilton Hall, MC 2861 New York, NY 10027 USA (map)

Hello everyone,

We are excited to invite you to the fourth and last talk of the Spring 2025 Semester!

Jake Haagenson (Columbia University) will give his talk entitled:

Socratic Ignorance in the First Alcibiades 

and Implications for Authenticity

The talk will occur on Friday, May 9th, at 4:10 p.m. EDT in Hamilton 603, in person and on Zoom. A reception will follow. 

If you would like to receive a Zoom link, please email Holly Axford (ha2694@columbia.edu). The Zoom link will be circulated the day before the talk.


Socratic Ignorance in the First Alcibiades 

and Implications for Authenticity

Abstract:

There is academic controversy over whether the First Alcibiades is a genuine work of Plato. Yuji Kurihara (2012) argues that one piece of evidence against authenticity is that, in the dialogue in question, Socrates expresses so-called “Socratic ignorance” as knowing (eidenai) that one does not know; whereas in works less doubtfully by Plato, such as the Apology, Socrates only avows that he thinks (oiesthai) he does not know. I agree with Kurihara that this is a difference that deserves readers’ attention. However, I offer that there are substantive reasons for Socrates’ use of eidenai to describe the cognitive attitude of one who is aware of her own ignorance. In order to make better sense of Socrates suggestive use of eidenai, I propose to turn from what commentators widely agree is a central concern of the First Alcibiades, self-knowledge, to the related conceptions of first-order knowledge that the dialogue evokes and, perhaps, explores. I argue that the First Alcibiades develops two criteria, one formal and the other substantive, for the sort of first-order knowledge that is the target of Socratic inquiry, especially in Platonic dialogues that ask so-called “ti esti” questions. I propose that the formal criterion holds that someone who knows (x) will not contradict herself concerning (x) and that the substantive criterion requires that someone who knows (x) will have an expert conception of (x). Based on these criteria, which allow one to diagnose knowledge or ignorance, Socrates is positioned to describe Socratic ignorance as knowing that one does not know. In that case, Socrates’ distinctive use of eidenai is motivated by the substance of the dialogue and denotes a philosophical innovation. I suggest, then, that if Socrates use of eidenai lends any indication concerning authenticity, the philosophical innovation backgrounding this use is of the sort very much at home in Plato’s corpus.